Australian Aviation Security Quiz

Copyright ©2005 Mark Newton <newton@atdot.dotat.org>

Since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC on September 11th 2001, Governments across the world have placed a newfound priority on domestic security. National security is no longer about something that protects our borders from outside assault; it's now intimately concerned with what happens within our country.

It makes us feel safe and comfortable to think that there's someone, somewhere in the Government who actually knows something about domestic security, and is implementing security measures with our best interests at heart.

Unfortunately, though, it's reasonably obvious that that isn't the case. Almost all of the domestic security "enhancements" which have been implemented since 2001 have very little real effect on anyone's ability to attack anything they like. Most security measures are what Bruce Schneier likes to call "Security Theatre," measures which make you think, "Well, it must be enhancing security otherwise they wouldn't make us put up with all this annoying crap!"

So we now live in a world where everyone over the age of 16 is allowed to drive a vehicle which is fueled from a petrol tank containing stored chemical energy equivalent of two sticks of Dynamite, even though sales of nitrate-based fertilizer are heavily controlled. And because most people simply swallow "security" without giving it any critical thought, very few people think about the fact that people who want to blow things up would be crashing petrol-filled cars into them instead of using explosives; And the fact that nobody is crashing petrol-filled cars into things probably means that there isn't anyone out there who wants to do it; And if there's nobody out there who wants to blow things up, why are we spending all this money to prevent it?

If we think hard about the security theatre which has been imposed on us over the last few years, we're forced to conclude that most of it is ham-fisted at best. At worst some of the "security" measures we have actually AID attackers, by sending signals about what our security institutions are actually interested in looking for, and allowing attackers to calibrate their attacks to avoid telltales which might tip-off the authorities. And we've collectively spent billions of dollars to arrive at this result. Is that expenditure wise if the magnitude of the credible threat is extremely low?

(update 21 November 2005: Commonwealth Immigration Minister Senatator Amanda Vanstone doesn't seem to think so. I almost uniformly take the opposite view to the good Senator on pretty much every issue she ever opens her mouth to talk about, but we're strangely united on this one. Go figure...)

Lets look at aviation security as an example...

Part 1: General

  1. Aviation regulators like to suggest that airline cabins are secure. In your opinion, what is the minimum number of times a passenger and their hand luggage ought to be screened by metal detectors and X-rays before they can be considered "secure"? Remember this number, you'll need it later.
  2. After TWA flight 800 blew up, the FBI suspected that it may have exploded due to a bomb disguised in a laptop. Across the world, procedures at terminals were altered to insist that laptops be removed from their bags for separate X-raying during pre-boarding passenger screening. Was TWA flight 800 actually blown up by a disguised laptop, or was the explosion caused by a fuel tank defect?
  3. Even if TWA flight 800 was blown up by a laptop, would requiring laptops to be removed from their bags before X-raying actually prevent another altered laptop from blowing up another plane?
  4. Would the laptop power supply, which is allowed to remain in the bag, be able to blow up a plane if it was stuffed full of Cemtex?
  5. Occasionally security staff will request that the passenger turn their laptop on, to make sure that the battery compartment hasn't been stuffed full of Cemtex. Does turning on the laptop indicate whether or not the CDROM and/or hard disk compartments have been stuffed full of Cemtex?
  6. If it is suspected that a laptop contains a bomb, does a request by security staff to activate it in a crowded airline terminal INCREASE or DECREASE the risk to the travelling public?
  7. Could bombs or weapons be concealed in any other pieces of consumer electronics which don't have to be removed from their cases and turned on? (e.g., mobile phones, iPods, CD players, etc)
  8. Based on your answers to 1.2 thru 1.7 above, indicate whether requiring laptops to be removed from laptop bags for screening actually improves security in aircraft passenger cabins.
  9. Based on your answer to 1.8, indicate whether you think security outcomes would improve, decay, or remain the same if the rules regarding laptops were completely removed, and they were treated like any other piece of hand luggage.

Part 2: Regional airports

  1. In 1.1 above, you described a minimum number of times a passenger and their hand luggage must be scanned or inspected before boarding in order to render a passenger compartment "secure". How many times are passengers and hand luggage scanned or inspected prior to boarding at regional airports? (e.g., Bathurst, Port Augusta, etc)
  2. As a member of the travelling public, do you feel safe from security-related incidents when you are travelling in the cabin of an aircraft on a flight originated from a regional airport?
  3. Given you answer in 2.1 above, and compared against your answer in 1.1 above, are you actually safe?
  4. As a member of the non-travelling public, do you feel safe as you walk around your home city with the knowledge that aircraft which have originated at regional airports are flying over your head?
  5. Given you answer in 2.1 above, and compared against your answer in 1.1 above, are you actually safe?
  6. A regional airline flight from, say, Portland to Melbourne will result in a turboprop aircraft flying through Melbourne airspace with a passenger cabin full of people who have been screened according to your answer in 2.1 above. Based on your answer to question 1.1, do you think Melbourne's airspace can be considered "secure"?

Part 3: Metropolitan airports

  1. If you are departing from a flight at a metropolitan airport, how many times must you and your hand luggage be screened or inspected before you board the B767 that'll take you to your eventual destination?
  2. If you are transferring from a flight operated by a regional airline to an intercapital flight operated by a larger airline, how many times must you and your hand luggage be screened or inspected before you board the B767 at the metropolitan airport that'll take you to your eventual destination?
  3. Is the number quoted in 3.2 above greater than or less than the number you arrived at in 3.1 ?
  4. Is the number quoted in 3.2 above greater than or less than the number you arrived at in 1.1 ?
  5. As a member of the travelling public, do you feel safe from security-related incidents while travelling in a passenger jet cabin on a flight originated from a metropolitan airport, when informed of the possibility that at least one of your fellow passengers may have originated at a regional airport?
  6. Given your answer in 3.4, are you actually safe?
  7. As a member of the general public, do you feel safe while walking around your metropolitan area with the knowledge that Boeing 767s fully-laden with jet fuel are flying over your head?
  8. Given your answer in 3.4, are you actually safe?

Part 4: Security expenditure

  1. Over the years, the Government has spent several billion dollars on passenger screening equipment at metropolitan airports. Given your answer in question 3.4 above, do you think that expenditure has increased security, decreased security, or made no difference to security?
  2. Given your answer in 4.1, do you think the Government has established an intelligent track record of expenditure on security over the years?
  3. With all due consideration to your answer in 4.2 above, describe whether you think the ADDITIONAL security funding the Government is acquiring during this year's federal budget will be spent intelligently?
  4. Given your answer in 3.4 above, do you think there would be any measurable difference in the ability of an attacker to co-opt a jet aircraft over a major capital city if there was no pre-boarding passenger screening at all?
  5. Based on your answer in 4.4 above, describe whether you think ceasing any further funding on pre-boarding passenger screening and spending the money on well-trained Federal Police, Customs, Immigration and ASIO investigative agents instead would deliver outcomes which are more secure, less secure, or just as secure.
  6. Having examined your answers throughout the rest of this quiz, do you think our airlines are secure?
  7. Based on the answer you gave in 4.6, do you think the billions of dollars spent by the Government and the airlines since Sept 11 2001 have constituted good security investments or poor security investments? Discuss.
  8. Our airlines are obviously not plagued by crowding masses of people who are trying to blow them up, crash them or hijack them. If someone WANTED to blow up a plane, crash one, or hijack it, can you see any realistic obstacles that would prevent them from boarding an aircraft equipped with the means to carry out that threat?
  9. Based on your answer in 4.8, and compared against your personal knowledge of the number of explosions, crashes and hijackings that have been attempted (successfully or otherwise) in Australia, estimate the number of people in Australia who currently have a serious desire to blow up, crash or hijack commercial aircraft.
  10. The billions spent since September 2001 have "bought" us a certain amount of security. How many of the individuals estimated in 4.9 have been caught or prevented from carrying out plans to blow up, crash or hijack commercial aircraft as a result of the purchase of that level of security?
  11. Given your answer to 4.9 above, do you think Australia would have captured or prevented more terrorists, less terrorists or the same number of terrorists if security expenditure was INCREASED?
  12. Given your answer to 4.9 above, do you think Australia would have captured or prevented more terrorists, less terrorists or the same number of terrorists if security expenditure was DECREASED?
  13. With consideration given to all of the previous answers, do you believe the Australian public is getting value for money for its security expenditure?
  14. If a tax measure was passed to provide funding to an organization charged with the responsibility to build new roads, and following expenditure of that funding the number of roads in Australia changed in a manner similar to what you've identified in 4.10, would you, as a member of the voting public, continue to approve the provision of funding to that organization?
  15. Is there something magical about security that makes it exempt from the principle you used to arrive at your answer to question 4.14?